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Abstract—In this paper, we investigate the resilience of Massive
MIMO Physical Layer Network Coding (PNC) to jamming attack
in both sub-6 GHz and millimeter-Wave (mmWave) systems
in vehicular networks. Massive MIMO generally is resilient
to jamming attacks, and we investigate the impact that PNC
has on this resilience, if combined with Massive MIMO. The
combination of Massive MIMO and PNC has shown a significant
improvement in the bit error rate (BER) in our previous
investigation. The corresponding framework is analysed against
a barraging attack from a jammer, where the jamming channel
is not known to the base station (BS), and the jammer can
use any number of transmit antennas. Over Rayleigh channel,
our simulation results reveal that Massive MIMO PNC performs
better in the lower signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) regions to jamming
attacks and this is achieved at twice the spectral efficiency. A
similar performance is observed over mmWave channel.
Index Terms—Massive MIMO, Physical Layer Network Cod-
ing, Vehicular Networks, Jamming.
I. INTRODUCTION
The broadcast nature of the wireless medium has un-
doubtedly propelled some significant innovations that allow
users to access network resources from nearly any convenient
location. These innovations enable mobile users to access
real-time information whilst on the move, allowing increase
in coverage and scalable deployment of network resources.
Interference has been one of the main challenges to deal
with in such an open air interface in wireless communication,
where signals from multiple sources arrive simultaneously at
a receiver. Although, there is no interference that is friendly,
some forms of interference can be controlled by regulating
the transmission of the interference sources. Unfortunately,
some forms of interference are intentional and uncontrollable.
They fall into the category of denial-of-service (DoS) attack
and are often referred to as radio-frequency (RF) jamming.
RF jamming is a malicious attempt to overwhelm a wireless
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communication system with the objective of sabotaging the
normal operation of the network [27].
Physical Layer Network Coding (PNC) is a key physical
layer (PHY) technique that has the potential to overcome
the adverse impacts of interference by applying Network
Coding (NC) to received electromagnetic (EM) radio waves
that constitute a superposition of a multitude of transmitted
signals. The concept of PNC has been extensively studied
in [1]–[3], among others. The original idea of applying NC
at the PHY, leveraging on the additive nature of the wire-
less medium was detailed in [1], [2] where an information
theoretic approach was employed, with emphasis on the rate
region of the Gaussian two-way relay channel (TWRC). Joint
channel coding and PNC was also investigated in [2] and the
performance found to be better than just PNC.
MIMO is increasingly gaining attention in the PNC field,
leveraging on its multiplexing gain. In [4], the authors pro-
posed a linear detection based scheme using log-likelihood
ratio (LLR) and selective combining. The relay utilizes the
summation and difference of the two end packets, and then
converts them to a NC symbol. The investigation in [4]
employed a 2×2 MIMO with BPSK modulation. This work
was then extended in [5] to a 4×4 MIMO relay system,
where the relay is equipped with four antennas and two UEs,
each equipped with two antennas. The authors observed a
multiplexing gain when the number of antennas at both the
relay node and the two UEs are increased. In [6] and [7], an
eigen-direction alignment precoding scheme is proposed for
MIMO TWRCs, where multiple independent PNC streams
are created over aligned eigenmodes. In [8]–[10], analog
network coding (ANC) based MIMO TWRC was investigated.
However, ANC is known to propagate noise from one node
to another, and therefore, the performance is not as good as
the schemes in which each node tries to clean up the noise
[11].
Later in [12]–[14], it was shown that in a MIMO PNC
scheme, when a user selects the transmit antenna with the
strongest channel condition, it significantly outperforms space-
time block codes. A channel-quantized PNC (CQ-PNC) that
converts K received signals at the relay into two signals by an
orthogonal matrix, Q, and upper triangular matrix, R, or QR
matrices decomposition in a MIMO TWRC is proposed in [15]
which showed that CQ-PNC can achieve full diversity gain of
K. A full-duplex TWRC in Massive MIMO together with
a lattice-based PNC was investigated in [16], which showed
that their proposed scheme requires just a single time slot
to exchange information across TWRC, whereas four time
slots would be needed in a conventional TWRC. PNC has
also been considered in 5G MIMO systems for backhauling,
as opposed to cloud radio access network (Cloud-RAN), and
also for coordinated multipoint (CoMP) [17]–[19].
Jamming attack in itself is considered under the umbrella
of active attack in physical layer security (PLS) [20]. The
broadcast nature of the wireless medium makes the physical
layer the most vulnerable layer. PLS solutions approach
security issues from information theoretic perspective, by
leveraging on the randomness, interference and other char-
acteristics as observed by the PHY. However, some attacks,
particularly those categorised under active attacks, might re-
quire countermeasure approaches that include PHY algorithms
and techniques that can withstand the attack with little or
no degradation. The countermeasure approaches address the
proactive types of jamming attacks [21], where the attacker’s
main objective is to thwart the normal operation of a wireless
system by persistently sending jamming signals. One of the
most prevailing jamming technique is deploying noise.
Noise jamming techniques reduce the cumulative received
SNR by increasing the thermal noise level at the receiver.
Barrage jamming, spot jamming and sweep jamming are the
three most common types of noise jamming [21]. These noise
jamming techniques, respectively, focus the transmit power on
multiple frequencies at the same time, a fleet of frequencies
and a single frequency. A number of jamming attacks research
in radar systems have focused on the Barrage jamming where
the entire bandwidth of the transmission is targeted with noise.
The adverse effect of jamming has been extensively studied,
as outlined in [22]. The effect of jamming in millimeter-wave
(mmWave) communications has been examined in [23], [24].
For the mmWave Massive MIMO systems, a reinforcement
learning based power control strategy, based on the signal-
to-interference-plus-noise ratio (SINR) of the signals and the
jamming strength has been considered in [23], while a hybrid
beamforming design to cancel the interference coming from
jamming signal has been presented in [24].
In our recently published work [27], we developed a
practical approach for deploying PNC in multi-user Massive
MIMO systems, utilizing QPSK modulation scheme. In this
Massive MIMO PNC work, we formulated a Maximum a
Posteriori (MAP) based PNC mapping scheme, leveraging on
the existing MIMO’s linear detectors such as Zero-Forcing
(ZF) and Minimum Mean Square Error (MMSE). The trans-
missions were over the Rayleigh fading channel with additive-
white Gaussian noise (AWGN) at the receive antennas and
the performance evaluation revealed that in the lower SNR
regime, our PNC scheme outperformed conventional Massive
MIMO in those structured noisy and interfered channels. The
lingering question is now if such a robust PNC scheme can
withstand uncontrolled jamming signals from a jammer.
In this paper, we study a multi-user Massive MIMO system,
where a base station’s (BS) capacity to perform PNC is
challenged by an active jammer that persistently transmits
jamming signals. We investigate the error performance of
the BS’s capability to estimate the PNC symbols amid the
active jamming signals. The contributions of this work are
summarized as follows. This work:
• investigates the resilience of an existing robust PNC
scheme over jamming attack in Rayleigh channels, fo-
cusing on the error performance.
• models the jamming signal using Gaussian noise, such
that the jamming signal dominates the received AWGN
noise at the receive antennas of the BS.
• examines jamming attacks in mmWave communications
by employing the robust PNC scheme.
• evaluates and analyzes the performance of the system, us-
ing Monte-Carlo simulations, and provides perspectives
on the implications of the results.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In
Section II, we present the Massive MIMO PNC system model
and considered scenarios. The channel models for both sub-6
GHz and mmWave systems are given in Section III. In Section
IV, the performance analysis of Massive MIMO PNC under
jamming attack is presented, followed with the simulation
results in Section V. The conclusions and future research
directions are given in section VI.
II. JAMMING ATTACK TO A MASSIVE-MIMO PNC
SYSTEM
The system model is shown in Fig. 1 and it depicts a single
cell Massive MIMO with centralized BS, through which the
legitimate users (LUEs) communicate. The goal in this setup
is for each of the LUEs to communicate and receive symbols
from every other LUE. The LUEs transmit their symbols in
the uplink (UL), the BS estimates the PNC symbols from the
aggregated received symbols and then broadcasts the PNC
symbols back in the downlink (DL) to the respective LUEs.
In the same system model, there is a jammer whose objective
is to sabotage the correctness of the PNC symbols estimation
by sending jamming signals. The jammer has a few degrees
of freedom in adversely influencing the estimation of the PNC
symbols by the BS. These include the transmit power of
the jamming signal and number of antennas to transmit the
jamming signals. In essence, it is assumed that the jammer has
multiple number of transmit antennas. The jammer’s position
is assumed to be outside of the cell in which the LUEs are
communicating through the BS. The channel between the BS
and the jammer is assumed not to be known by the BS and
communications between these two entities are independent of
the communications between the BS and LUEs. The jamming
technique can be assumed to be any of those mentioned in
Section I.
In this single cell Massive MIMO scenario, M denotes the
number of antennas through which the BS receives UL mes-
sages from the LUEs, N denotes the number of LUEs which
are equipped with K number of antennas, and L = K × N
input antennas. As depicted in Fig. 1, the received symbols
vector at the BS is given by
r = Hs+ Jz + n , (1)
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Fig. 1. A System Model for a Multi-user Massive MIMO Vehicular Network under Jamming Attack.
where r ∈ CM×1 denotes received symbols complex vector,
s =
[
s1 s2 . . . sL
]T ∈ CL×1, is the transmitted symbols
complex vector from all users, H ∈ CM×L is the complex
channel matrix, J ∈ CM×J is the jammer to BS complex
channel matrix, z ∈ CJ×1 is the jamming signal symbol
complex vector, and n ∈ CM×1 is independent and identically
distributed (i.i.d.) AWGN with zero mean and variance, σ2n.
We assume that the transmitted symbols are Gray-scale M-ary
Quadrature Amplitude Modulation (QAM) and the average
transmitted energy per symbol is E[|si|2] = Es /L, where Es
is the M-ary QAM symbol energy at each antenna.
We consider linear detectors to estimate the transmitted
symbols from the received symbols at the receive antennas of
the BS. Zero Forcing (ZF) and Minimum Mean Square Error
(MMSE) detectors are the main focus with respect to linear
detectors. They are known to have desirable computational
complexity and are proven to perform well in Massive MIMO
networks [27]. We also assume that there is a perfect channel
state information (CSI) at the BS (i.e., the channel matrix H is
known at the receiver (BS)). The estimated complex symbols
vector, ŝ, is given as
ŝ = Gr, (2)
where G is the complex detection matrix, which is also
expressed, respectively, for ZF and MMSE, as
GZF = (HHH)−1HH , (3)
GMMSE = (HHH + σ2nI)
−1HH, (4)
where σ2n is AWGN noise variance at the received antennas.
As shown in (3) and (4), GZF and GMMSE are both dependent
on the complex channel matrix, H .
As already stated in previous sections, in [27], we developed
a Massive MIMO PNC algorithm, where a multi-antenna BS
estimates PNC symbols from received interfered symbols,
which are composed of superimposed transmitted symbols
from multi-user multi-antenna UEs. The concept is based
on a linear transformation of the channel between the BS
and the UEs, using a sum-difference (SD) matrix, under the
assumption that channel is known to the BS. The SD matrix
ensures that the transmitted symbols are grouped into clusters
of transmit antennas, from the UEs that intend to communicate
with each other. The BS then estimates a sum and difference
of the transmitted symbols in the cluster, from the received
symbols using linear detectors such as ZF and MMSE. The
detection matrix is based on the SD transformed channel
matrix. Therefore, the distinction here is that for conventional
Massive MIMO, the complex detection matrix is dependent
on the original complex channel matrix, whereas the complex
detection matrix for the Massive MIMO PNC is dependent on
the transformed complex channel matrix. We refer the reader
to [27] for further details of the PNC scheme.
If we consider our previous work on the Massive MIMO
PNC scheme, then the system model in (1) is further expressed
as
r = (HP sd
−1)(P sds) + Jz + n (5)
= H sdssd + Jz + n, (6)
where P sd is the SD matrix, H sd =
1
2
HP sd, is the linear
transformation of the MIMO channel with a SD matrix, and
ssd = P sds, clusters of SD symbols, whose estimates at the
BS, are then mapped to the PNC symbols. Although the term
Jz in (5) is missing in the corresponding equation in [27],
the estimation of the ssd, SD symbols, also remains the same
using the following equalization matrix
Gsd =
{
(Hsd
HHsd)
−1HsdH, for ZF
(Hsd
HHsd + σ
2
nI)
−1HsdH, for MMSE
, (7)
and the estimated SD symbols is given as
ŝsd = Gsdr. (8)
III. CHANNEL MODELLING
In this section, we will describe the channel models for
both sub-6 GHz and mmWave frequencies.
A. Sub-6 GHz Model
The channel model for sub-6 GHz has been one of the
well researched fields. Until recent progress in mmWave, the
radio propagation in the sub-6 GHz was perceived as the
most favorable radio propagation channel. It is still the most
reliable spectrum for radio propagation, amid the scarcity of
bandwidth for future wireless communication systems.
In this sub-section, we assume a multi-path propaga-
tion medium with worse-case of line-of-sight (LoS), making
Rayleigh fading channel the prime focus. Given that H in
(1) is assumed to be a Rayleigh fading complex channel
matrix, its distribution can be modeled as a joint probability
distribution of its in-phase and quadrature components. The
complex entries of H , i.e. hij , where i is the receive antenna
index and j, the transmit antenna index, are i.i.d. Gaussian
random variables of zero mean and a unit variance.
The effect of the jamming signal at the BS antennas is
modelled as an additive noise. In the presence of a jammer,
the term Jz in (1) is assumed to dominate over the AWGN,
n. The signal-to-jamming plus noise ratio (SJNR) is expressed
as SJNR = L×Es/(σ2n +σ2z ), where σ2z is the jamming noise
variance. The signal-to-jamming ratio (SJR) is given as SJR =
J × Ez / σ2z . In the absence of a jammer, the signal-to-noise
ratio is given as, SNR = L×Es / σ2n . The effect of the term
Jz in (6), is the prime focus of this investigation. Treating
the jamming signal, z, as additive noise, then the lower bound
of the performance of the system model is achieved since the
worst case jamming signal is Gaussian when the transmitted
signal is considered to be Gaussian [29]. Therefore, in our
system model, the jamming term is modeled as Gaussian for
sub-6 GHz. If the jamming does not dominate the AWGN, n,
then the decoding performance is expected to be similar to
the results in our existing work [28]. Therefore, the target is
to evaluate the error performance of the system model when
the jamming term, Jz, dominates n.
B. mmWave Model
The mmWave system consists of a BS equipped with M
antennas having uniform linear array (ULA) antenna structure
and M radio frequency (RF) chains, communicating with N
legitimate single-antenna users in a single cell. The mmWave
channel model is composed of the LoS and the non-LoS
(nLoS) components [25], [26].
The channel matrix of the nth user, Hn ∈ CM×1, is given
as
Hn = H
LoS
n +H
nLoS
n , (9)
where HLoSn and H
nLoS
n , respectively, denote the LoS compo-
nent and the nLos components of the mmWave channel and
they are respectively, defined as
HLoSn = α
LoS
n · an(ϕRxLoS) · (an(ϕTxLoS))H, (10)
HnLoSn =
1√
Sn,c
C∑
c=1
Sn,c∑
s=1
αn,c,s · an(ϕRxc,s) · (an(ϕTxc,s))H,
(11)
where C and Sn,c denote the number of clusters and the
number of sub-paths in each cluster, respectively. α represents
instantaneous complex channel gain for LoS and nLoS com-
ponents. Moreover, ϕ indicates the azimuth angle and a(ϕRx),
a(ϕTx) respectively, denote angle of arrival (AoA) array factor
at the receiver and angle of departure (AoD) array factor at
the transmitter. (a(.))H denotes the complex transpose of the
antenna array factor.
For the ULA, the antenna array response is defined by,
a(ϕ) =
1√
M
[1, . . . , ej(m−1)kdx sin(ϕ), . . . , ej(M−1)kdx sin(ϕ)]T
(12)
where M is the number of antennas in horizontal axis, k is the
wave number which is defined as k = 2piλ . The inter-element
spacing (distance between two adjacent antenna elements) is
indicated by dx = 0.5λ.
IV. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS OF MASSIVE MIMO PNC
UNDER JAMMING ATTACK
The BER analytical analysis of Massive MIMO PNC, with
transmission in Rayleigh channel, is rather tedious. Therefore,
the focus of this paper is to investigate the error performance
analysis using numerical analysis. Before looking into the
simulation results, we would like to establish the procedure in
the evaluation of the BER performance of the Massive MIMO
PNC, over Rayleigh channel, and under jamming attack. In
(8), we established how Massive MIMO linear detection is
utilized in the PNC scheme to estimate SD symbols from the
received symbols, using a detection matrix based on rather
a linear SD transformed channel matrix. Estimating the SD
symbols from the received symbols is just a step to the
final goal, which is estimating the actual PNC symbols. The
estimation of the PNC is a function of the estimated SD
symbols as given below
ŝPNC = fPNC(ŝsd) , (13)
where ŝPNC is the estimated PNC symbols, fPNC(.), the
PNC estimation function and ŝsd, the estimated SD symbols.
Maximum a posteriori (MAP) estimation is a well known
Bayesian inference estimator that can be used to estimate
an unknown parameter, given an observation. To estimate
the PNC symbols, given the SD symbols, MAP estimator is
used. Assuming θ is the unknown to be determined from the
observation, x, then MAP estimator is given as, the θ that
maximizes the posteriori, as expressed below
θ̂MAP = argmax
θ
P (θ|x) (14)
≈ argmax
θ
P (x|θ)P (θ) , (15)
where P (θ|x) is the posteriori or the conditional probability of
the unknown, θ, given the observation, x, whereas P (x|θ) is
the likelihood or the conditional probability of the observation
given the unknown, and P (θ) and P (x) are respectively,
the marginal distribution functions for the unknown and the
observation. If P (θ) is assumed to be equally likely, then
the MAP estimator approximates to Maximum Likelihood
Estimator (MLE) as follows
θ̂MAP ≈ argmax
θ
P (x|θ) = θ̂MLE . (16)
Having defined the MAP decoder, we can now employ it
in our PNC Mapping scheme in Massive MIMO systems in
estimating the NC symbols at the physical layer. In [28],
clusters of estimated SD symbols that are mapped to PNC
symbols are expressed as {(ŝsd,i , ŝsd,Q+i) | 1 ≤ i ≤ Q}. We
assume that the corresponding set of clusters of transmitted
input symbol, {(si, sQ+i) | 1 ≤ i ≤ Q, si, sQ+i ∈ Θ}, are
modulated symbols from the constellation, represented as Θ.
Then, the Likelihood of obtaining the PNC symbol, ̂si ⊕ sQ+i,
such that ̂si ⊕ sQ+i ∈ Θ is expressed as
L( ̂si ⊕ sQ+i = v|ŝsd,i , ŝsd,Q+i)
=
∑
v∈Θ
P (ŝsd,i , ŝsd,Q+i | ̂si ⊕ sQ+i = v)
=
∑
v∈Θ
P (ŝsd,i | ̂si ⊕ sQ+i = v)P (ŝsd,Q+i | ̂si ⊕ sQ+i = v)
=
∑
v∈Θ
P (ŝsd,i |s¯(v)sd,i )P (ŝsd,Q+i |s¯
(v)
sd,Q+i) , (17)
where s¯(v)sd,i and s¯
(v)
sd,Q+i , are respectively, the expected summation
and difference symbols, mapped to the PNC symbol, v ∈ Θ.
Since the noise in (1) and (6) is assumed to be AWGN, the
likelihood function can be assumed to be Gaussian. Using the
Gaussian probability density function, (17) can be expressed
further as
L( ̂si ⊕ sQ+i = v|ŝsd,i , ŝsd,Q+i)
=
∑
v∈Θ
1
2pi
√
σ2i σ
2
Q+i
e
−
(
ŝsd,i − s¯(v)sd,i
)2
2σ2i
e
−
(
ŝsd,Q+i − s¯(v)sd,Q+i
)2
2σ2Q+i , (18)
where σ2i , σ
2
Q+i are the noise variances of the i
th and
{Q+ i}th streams, respectively. Knowing the general like-
lihood’s function for the set of all clusters, L( ̂si ⊕ sQ+i =
v|ŝsd,i , ŝsd,Q+i), the MAP estimator in (16) can be employed to
determine the PNC symbol of each cluster as follows
( ̂si ⊕ sQ+i)(v)MAP
≈ argmax
̂si⊕sQ+i
L( ̂si ⊕ sQ+i = v|ŝsd,i , ŝsd,Q+i)P (ŝsd,i , ŝsd,Q+i).
(19)
The overall set of estimated PNC symbols is expressed as
ŝ iPNC = fPNC(ŝsd,i , ŝsd,Q+i)
= {( ̂si ⊕ sQ+i)(v)MAP | 1 ≤ i ≤ Q, v ∈ Θ}. (20)
V. SIMULATION RESULTS
In this section, we present the simulation results for both
the sub-6 GHz and mmWave systems.
A. In Sub-6 GHz
In this subsection, we evaluate the error performance of
MIMO PNC scheme against jamming attack in sub-6GHz
frequencies. The simulation parameters are listed in Table I.
In the simulation, we have a BS with multiple number of
antennas communicating with LUEs, and for simplicity, we
assume that the number of antennas at each LUE is the
same. The jammer is also assumed to have multiple number
of antennas and transmitting independently of the LUEs.
The objective of the BS is to perform PNC employing the
algorithm in [28], whereas, that of the jammer is to introduce
errors in the PNC algorithm execution. In the simulation
setup, the jammer has a couple of possibilities to influence the
performance of the BS. We simulated various scenarios that
include conventional MIMO without PNC, MIMO with PNC,
with and without jamming attack. We regulated the transmit
power and the number of antennas of the jammer, and then,
countered it with regulating the dimension of the received
antennas of the BS and also the modulation scheme. cases of
MIMO and PNC and the jammer.
Fig. 2 presents the error performance for all use cases when
the modulation scheme is QPSK, employing both ZF and
MMSE. The BS has four antennas, and each of the two UEs
has two antennas and the jammer has a single antenna with
SJR of 10dB. Although the dimension of the antennas at the
BS in this setup is not Massive MIMO, its worth providing
result for completeness. In the simulation result, the BER of
MIMO and PNC is comparably better in all use cases. The
BER of the MMSE-based use cases performed better than
the ZF counterpart, which is as expected, as ZF does not
consider noise at the receive antennas in the detection of the
transmitte symbols. Among the use cases, it can be seen that
non-jammed MIMO and PNC performed better than the non-
jammed, but only MIMO. This shows that MIMO and PNC
can coexist without any detriment to the performance of the
former. It can also be seen that both jammed MIMO and
jammed MIMO PNC performed comparatively close to the
non-jammed counterpart, until at about 15dB SNR. Further
from this SNR, the jammed BER for the usecases starts
to remain steady. This is an indication of the PNC scheme
TABLE I
SIMULATION PARAMETERS
Parameters Values
No. antennas at BS, M 4, . . . , 16
No. antennas per UE, K 2
No. UEs, N 2, . . . , 8
Channel, H i.i.d Rayleigh
SNR [dB] 0, . . . , 50
Modulation QPSK, 16QAM
Packet size per UE 100 modulated symbols
No. iterations 104
Channel Coding Uncoded
Linear Detectors ZF, MMSE
No. antennas at Jammer, J {1, 2}
SJR [dB] 10, . . . , 20
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Fig. 2. BER performance comparison between i) conventional multi-user
MIMO ii) multi-user MIMO with jamming, iii) multi-user MIMO with PNC
and iv) multi-user MIMO with PNC and jamming, with 10dB jamming SJR
, for M=4, N=2, K=2 and J=1.
performing well against jamming in the lower SNR region,
and this is achieved at twice the spectral efficiency.
In Fig. 3, utilizing the same setup as Fig. 2, we doubled
the number of antennas of the jammer. The simulation result
revealed a degrade in the former compared to the latter. This
is an indication that by increasing the number of antennas
of the jammer, the jamming signal adversely influences the
decoding capabilities of the BS. The jammer may not want
to expend extra cost in its quest of impairing the decoding
capabilities of the BS, by increasing the number of transmit
antennas.
We increased the number of antennas at the BS to sixteen in
Fig. 4, with the rest of the simulation parameters remaining
the same as in Fig. 2. The simulation results of the former
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Fig. 3. BER performance comparison between i) conventional multi-user
MIMO ii) multi-user MIMO with jamming, iii) multi-user MIMO with PNC
and iv) multi-user MIMO with PNC and jamming, with 10dB jamming SJR,
for M=4, N=2, K=2 and and J=2.
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Fig. 4. BER performance comparison between i) conventional multi-user
MIMO ii) multi-user MIMO with jamming, iii) multi-user MIMO with PNC
and iv) multi-user MIMO with PNC and jamming, with 10dB jamming SJR,
for M=16, N=8, K=2 and J=1.
revealed a similar pattern to that of the latter, except the BER
starts to remain steady after 30dB SNR. This is an indication
that the more antennas the BS has, the better the resilience
against a jamming attack it has in the lower SNR regions.
In Fig. 5, we repeated the setup in Fig. 2 and Fig. 3, respec-
tively, except deploying a higher-order modulation scheme of
16-QAM. The result showed a similar pattern to the QPSK
counterpart, except the performance is better, as the BER
starts to remain steady at higher SNR, an indication that PNC
performs better in the lower SNR regions against jamming
attack.
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Fig. 5. BER performance comparison between i) conventional multi-user
MIMO ii) multi-user MIMO with jamming, iii) multi-user MIMO with PNC
and iv) multi-user MIMO with PNC and jamming, with 10dB jamming SJR,
for M=4, N=2, K=2 and J=1.
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Fig. 6. BER performance comparison of mmWave communications for
different schemes under jamming attack, with 30dB jamming SJR, for M=16,
N=16, K=1 and J=1.
B. In mmWave
In this subsection, we evaluate the BER performance in
the mmWave communications under jamming attacks by
employing PNC based on linear detection, which has lower
complexity. The mmWave channel parameters described in
[25] and [26] are used in our mmWave system simulation,
which includes one BS having M = 16 antennas and
communicating with N = 16 legitimate users. The simulation
results are shown in Fig. 6. It is observed that the mmWave
communications by employing PNC through linear detection
provides much better performance compared to the conven-
tional mmWave schemes.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
In this work, we investigated the resilience of Massive
MIMO PNC to jamming attack in both sub-6 GHz and
mmWave. In our previous work, we showed how the com-
bination of Massive MIMO and PNC does not impact the
BER any worse than it would in Massive MIMO system
without PNC. Infact, our results revealed that the BER of
Massive MIMO and PNC is slightly better than the BER of
only Massive MIMO. Massive MIMO is generally resilient to
jamming attack due its high degree of freedom. We investi-
gated our previous work on Massive MIMO and PNC against
a barraging attack from a jammer, when the jammer is able to
use any number of transmit antennas. Over Rayleigh fading
channels, our simulation results revealed that Massive MIMO
PNC performs better in lower SNRs to jamming attacks, as
opposed to the conventional Massive MIMO system, and at
twice the spectral efficiency. In addition to that, for mmWave
communications under jamming attack, the MIMO-PNC sys-
tem still provided acceptable BER performance.
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